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秦军功爵制的经济学分析——兼论秦军功爵制功效何以远超六国 被引量:4

An Economic Analysis of Qin's Military Merit Award
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摘要 本文尝试建立数理模型探讨战国时期军功爵制的功效及其实施的基础和演变过程。我们发现:军功爵制相对于五等爵制对国民有着更好的激励作用,而其实施则受制于长期民族文化累积所形成的文化特征和权力结构的制约。相比于东方各国,秦人尚功利轻伦理的民族性,君主至上的权力结构,君主的强有力支持和平民的热烈响应是这一新制度能够在短时间内在全秦推行的根源,最终助其统一天下。 By mathematical modeling,this paper is to explore the effectiveness and the evolution of the military merit award in the Warring States period in China.We find that the military merit award has a stronger incentive to the people than the original Five-ranked dignity award,while its implementation is constrained by the cultural characteristics and the power structure.Comparing to other countries,in Qin,the profit is preferred than ethics,and the monarch has the absolute power.All of these factors enforce the implementation of the military merit award in a short period,and it supports Qin to unify China eventually.
出处 《经济学(季刊)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第4期333-350,共18页 China Economic Quarterly
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