具有价格粘性的供应链动态模型及其协调策略

Dynamic Model and Coordination Strategy of Supply Chain with Sticky Price

本文针对由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的供应链系统,在市场价格具有粘性的情况下,利用动态博弈理论分析了制造商和零售商如何确定其最优的批发价格和产品订购量以实现自身长期利润的最大化。本文首先利用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别求解了供应链系统在Stackelberg博弈下的最优批发价格和最优产品订购数量。然后,利用数值算例说明了该供应链系统协调的必要性。最后,利用数量折扣契约协调了该供应链系统,并证明了协调的有效性。

Considering the supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer , this paper uses dynamic games theory to study how the manufacturer and retailer decide the optimal wholesale price and retail price respectively to maximize their own long-term profit under the condition of sticky price .Firstly, the Hamilton-Jacobi -Bellman equation is used to obtain the manufacturer ’ s optimal wholesale price and the retailer ’ s optimal order quantity under Stackelberg game .Secondly , a numerical example is presented to verify the necessity coordination the supply chain system .Finally, a quantity discount contract is used to coordinate the supply chain system, and the effectiveness of coordination is also proofed in this paper .