央企负责人、货币性薪酬与公司业绩

Executives of Central Enterprises,Monetary Compensation and Corporate Performance

本文从一个新视角即激励强度出发对央企负责人的货币性薪酬进行研究。实证研究表明,企业在高薪酬—业绩敏感度下所追求的ROE并不能代表企业价值的真正增长,此时负责人会有动力粉饰ROE,甚至会因为追求短期ROE从而丧失长期增长潜力,形成价值的负向增长;而反映公司长期价值增长的EVA与公司价值形成正向关系,而且基于EVA的激励强度越大公司市场价值越高。这说明只要衡量指标是正确的,央企高管的薪酬制定同样适用于最优契约。本文的结论支持了国资委目前正在实施的对央企负责人以EVA进行业绩评价的改革,并为收入分配体制改革提供理论研究证据。

This paper studies the monetary compensations of central enterprises＇ executives from a new point of incentive intensity. We find that after controlling of the monopolizing factor, the enterpris- es pursuing the high ROE under the pay-performance sensitivities conditions cannot represent their real value added. Because the managers will have the incentives to over-estimate ROEs, even maybe resulting the negative value added and losing the long-term growth potential for chasing the short horizon performance. But on the other hand, we find that pay-performance sensitivities based on Economic Value Added （EVA） are significant positive related to corporate value. And the more incentive intensity, the higher cor- porate market value. Although the economists have approved the validity of the optimal contract theory, but the others think because the central listed enterprises are almost in basic and monopolistic industries of national economy, they have the less risk and more profits, so the optimal contract theory doesn＇t apply to them. This paper researches from the point of the new policy issued by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission （SSAC） and find that if the evaluation variable is reasonable the Optimal Contract Theory also applies to the central enterprises. For calculating the EVAs we accord the new regulation issued by the SSAC and calculating the EVAs from 2007 to 2011.We find that the BHARs are significant negative related to ROE but positive related to EVA. It also shows that from the point of creating the long added value, the investors pay more attention to the EVA compared with the ROE. This finding are in favor of the current reform sponsored by the SASAC to use EVA as the new performance evaluation variable for the monetary compensations of central enterprises＇ executives instead of the original variable ROE. And the paper also provides empirical evidence to China＇s Income Distribution System Reform.