制度环境、声誉机制与会计稳健性

Institutional Environment, Reputation Mechanism, and Accounting Conservatism

以会计稳健性为基础,从信任角度分析并验证了声誉机制的有效性以及声誉对正式制度的替代作用。研究发现:公司声誉越高,会计稳健性越低,表明声誉能够增进信任、降低代理冲突;在制度环境较差的地区,公司声誉对会计稳健性的负向影响要大于制度环境较好的地区,表明声誉对正式制度具有一定的替代作用。

Based on accounting conservatism, this paper theoretically analyzes and verifies the effec- tiveness of reputation mechanism and the substitution effect of reputation on formal institutions from the per- spective of trust. The study finds that the higher firm＇s reputation is, the lower accounting conservatism ex- hibits, which suggests that reputation can improve trust and reduce agency conflict. In areas which have bad institution, the negative effect of reputation on accounting conservatism is greater than areas which have good institution. It verifies the substitution effect of reputation on formal institution. This paper provides theoretical support for prompting reputation and other informal institutions play an important role in market economy.