地方政府竞争、规制乏力与污染红利寻租

On the Important Reasons of Local Government competition、 Regulation Inefficiency and Pollution Dividend Rent-seeking

地方政府竞争引致污染红利的内在机理表现如下:首先,地方政府竞争会导致政府污染规制乏力;其次,政府污染规制乏力会导致污染红利。利用我国2001-2011年的省级面板数据对之进行实证检验,结果证实了上述研究结果的正确性,具体体现在:表征地方政府竞争的三个变量对污染红利的回归系数均为正数,且显著性极强,说明我国地方政府竞争对污染红利的增加具有正向影响;分地区回归结果显示,东、中、西部三个地区的地方政府竞争均导致了污染红利增加;地方政府竞争视角下的污染红利与人均收入不具库兹涅茨特征而呈现一种正向的线性关系。

The mechanism of pollution dividend caused by local government competition is as followed： （1） local government competition can lead inefficiency in pollution regulation （2） pollu- tion regulation inefficiency will cause pollution dividend. By using provincial-level panel data from 2001 to 2011, we make an empirical test, the result confirms the correctness of research conclu- sion. Firstly, the three variables characterized by local government competition cause more pollu- tion dividend, it turns out that competition has a positive effect on the increase in pollution divi- dend. Secondly, regional recession result shows that local government competition of eastern, cen- tral and western regions causes more pollution dividend. Thirdly, the relations between pollution dividend and per capita income is not a Kuznets curve hut a positive and linear relationship from the perspective of local government competition.