公平偏好下基于批发价契约的供应链协调研究

Study on the Coordination of Supply Chain in Wholesale Price Contract under Fairness-Preferencing

文中基于Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平偏好框架,构建公平偏好效用体系,以此为基础对采用批发价契约的报童模型展开行为研究,采用数理模型和数值分析方法分析了零售商和供应商的公平偏好行为对零售商和供应链系统最优订货量的影响,即零售商和供应商同时关注公平时,零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量趋于保守;并发现零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量随零售商的公平偏好程度增加而递减,但随着供应商公平偏好程度增加而递增,且供应链系统最优订货量变化趋势比零售商明显.然后,在此基础上分析比较得到,无论供应商和零售商是否偏好公平,批发价契约都不能实现供应链协调.最后,对批发价、零售价、供应商生产成本、零售商缺货成本和供应商缺货成本进行敏感度分析.

This paper established a fairness preference framework based on game theory of Nash bargaining, and built a utility system about fairness preference. On the basis, we expanded the newboy model to behavior research. The analysis shows that, because of retailer and suppliers＇ fairness preference, the optimal order quantities of supplier and supply chain tend to become conservative. Moreover, the result shows that the greater the retailer＇s fairness preference, the smaller the optimal order quantity of retailer and supply chain system, and the change tendency of the supply chain is more obvious than that of re tailer; the greater the suppliers fairness preference, the greater the optimal order quantity of retailer and supply chain system, and the change tendency of supply chain is more obvious than that of retailer. Furthermore, a conclusion has been made that the wholesale price contract doesn＇t change the supply chain coordination, regardless of retailer and supplier＇s fairness preference. Finally, we made the sensitivity analysis on the wholesale price, the retail price, the manufacturing cost of supplier, the stor age cost of retailer and the storage cost of supplier.