公平偏好下基于回购契约的供应链协调模型

The Supply Chain Coordination Considering Fairness Preference Based on Buy-Back Contract

在报童模型的基础上,以一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链为研究背景,把公平关切引入到回购契约的研究中,并根据Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平偏好框架,通过建立效用函数模型,研究了公平关切对回购契约的影响.研究发现,公平关切不会影响回购契约的协调性,公平关切程度也不会影响零售商的最优订购量,进而可以得出,即使供应商在不知道零售商对公平偏好的程度下,依然可以通过制定合适的批发价格和回购价格来做出使自己效用最大化的最优决策.另外,通过灵敏度分析发现,在公平关切时,零售商的最优订购量会随着产品单位生产成本的增加而增加.

A twostage supply chain that contains one supplier and one retailer was studied based on the Newsvendor model. The fairness preference was introduced into buy back contract. Also, a framework of fairness preference was estab lished according to the theory game of Nash bargaining. This paper studied the effect of fairness preference on the decision of the supply chain through building the utility function. And the results reflect that the fairness preference will not affect the co ordination of the buyback contract, the retailer＇s optimal order quantity will not change. Moreover, even the supplier doesn＇t know the retailer＇s degree of fairness preference, he can also design a wholesale price and a buy hack price to achieve utility maximization. Also, the numerical analysis shows that the retailer＇s optimal order quantity will increase as the cost increases when considering fairness preference.