委托代理理论下的寡头竞争机制研究——基于中国电信业的模型分析

Research on Mechanism of Oligopoly Competition Based on Principal Agent Theory——Based on China Telecommunication Industry

寡头垄断市场中,寡头企业往往在多项重叠的任务之间展开竞争,增加了国家监管部门设计行业竞争激励机制和寡头企业制定竞争战略的难度。以委托代理理论为基础,依据政府与各大运营商之间的复杂关系,将运营商所占市场份额和努力水平等因素引入经典的Stackelberg和Cournot寡头竞争模型,分析影响运营商利润的相关因素,结合中国电信、中国移动和中国联通的固话、移动和3G网络业务,建立关于电信运营商多任务竞争的委托代理模型,分析政府在保证市场达到纳什均衡条件下对三大运营商的激励问题。研究结果表明,三大运营商的利润与其所占市场份额和努力水平成正比,政府需依据各运营商的市场份额和努力水平等相关因素鼓励三大电信企业向综合信息服务商发展,并加强对各运营商的有效监管和激励。中国电信、中国移动和中国联通应集中精力做好固话业务、移动业务和3G网络业务等基础业务,在各自劣势业务上提高努力水平,增强核心竞争力。

Oligarch enterprises compete with each other by targeting differently in oligopoly market, which increases difficulty of constructing industry incentive mechanism competitively and competitive strategy of oligarch enterprises by the national regula- tors. This paper analyses the key factors in relation to profits making of operators by introducing market share of operators and managers＇ effort level to the classic Stackelberg and Cournot oligopoly model based on the principal-agent theory and complex re- lationship of government and operators. Accordingly, by combining the fixed-line services, mobile services and 3G business of China Telecom, China Mobile and China Unicom, this paper establishes multi-task principal-agent model so as to analyze the in- centive problems of three operators when the market is in Nash balance. The results show that operators＇profit is in direct propor- tion to the marker share and effort level, and itb a good idea for the government to strengthen the effective regulation and incen- tive, while encouraging the three operators to develop into integrated information service providers. China Telecoro, China Mo- bile, China Unicom should continuously provide the better basic services on fixed-line services, mobile services, 3G business while more efforts should be put on their individual advantageous services so as to enhance their core competitiveness.