股权结构、内部控制与盈余稳健性

Ownership Structure,Internal Control and Earnings Conservatism

国内外上市公司财务舞弊案件频发,揭示出上市公司内部控制系统的薄弱。我国内部控制规范体系的日渐完善为内部控制的研究提供了新的思路与依据。本文以2011年沪深A股主板上市公司为样本,首先检验了内部控制对盈余稳健性的影响,在此基础上结合我国上市公司特有的股权结构,进一步研究股权结构对内部控制与盈余稳健性关系的影响。研究发现:内部控制能显著提升盈余稳健性。此外,与国有公司相比,非国有公司中内部控制对盈余稳健性的提升作用更明显。大股东对上市公司的控制权比例、控制权与现金流权的分离程度也会对内部控制对于盈余稳健性的提升作用产生一定的影响。

Recently, financial fraud is frequently observed in listed companies in China and abroad, which reveals the weakness of the internal control system. Using China＇s listed companies in 2011 as sample, this study investigates the association between internal control effectiveness and earnings conservatism, and the effect of ownership structure on the association. Our findings demonstrate that more effective internal control could significantly improve earnings conservatism. In addition, compared to state -owned enterprises, the association between internal control and earnings conservatism becomes stronger in privately owned enterprises. Furthermore, the control rights of largest shareholders as well as the degree of separation between control rights and cash flow rights could also generate impact on the relation between internal control and earnings conservatism.