期刊文献+

家族企业经理人行为研究综述

Review on managers' behavior in family firms
下载PDF
导出
摘要 自伯利和米恩斯提出公司治理理论以来,有关经理人行为特征的研究一直受到经济学界的广泛关注。早期研究主要是基于先验的人性假设来讨论经理人的行为倾向和角色选择,但因其理论的片面性、极端性以及静止的观点而遭到学界普遍质疑和批判。近年来组织环境影响论将经理人行为选择及其变动的影响因素拓展至企业家族目标、信任、关系契约、企业治理、组织文化背景以及管理哲学等。而人际互动论则进一步把经理人的行为倾向选择归结为人与组织环境因素,特别是人与人之间双向互动的结果。 Since Berle and Means put forward the corporate governance theory in 1932, researches on the char- acteristics of managers' behavior have drawn extensive attention in economics. Early researches based their discus- sion of manager' s behavior and role selection mainly on the assumption of a priori human nature, which was widely questioned and criticized by academia because of its partial, extreme and static views. In recent years, organiza- tional environment impact theory expands the influences of manager' s behavior to family enterprise target, trust, relational contract, corporate governance, organizational culture background, management philosophy and many others. And interpersonal interaction theory makes a further step to attribute the influences of manager' s behavior to the factors of people and organization environment, especially the result of the bidirectional interaction between people.
出处 《南京邮电大学学报(社会科学版)》 2013年第4期45-51,共7页 Journal of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Science Edition)
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"基于家族企业的经理人行为倾向选择及其变动研究"(12YJA630016)
关键词 家族企业 经理人行为 代理理论 管家理论 family firm managers' behavior agency theory stewardship theory
  • 相关文献

参考文献29

  • 1JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs,and ownership structure[J].{H}Journal of Financial Economics,1976,(04):305-360.
  • 2BERLE A A,MEANS G C. The modern corporation and private property[M].{H}New York:Macmillan,1932.
  • 3DAVIS J H,SCHOORMAN F D,DONALDSON L. Towards a stewardship theory of management[J].{H}ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW,1997,(01):20-47.
  • 4DONALDSON L. A rational basis for criticisms of organizational economics:A reply to barney[J].{H}ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW,1990,(03):394-401.
  • 5BARNEY J B. The debate between traditional management theory and organizational economics:Substantive differences or intergroup conflict[J].{H}ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW,1990,(03):382-393.
  • 6SIMON H A. Altruism and economics[J].The American Economic Review,1993,(02):156-161.
  • 7ESHEL I,SAMUELSON L,SHAKED A. Altruists,egoists,and hooligans in a local interaction model[J].The American Economic Review,1998,(01):157-179.
  • 8BECKER G S. A treatise on the family[M].Cambridge,MA:Harvard UniversityPress,1981.
  • 9SCHULZE W S,LUBATKIN M H,DINO R N,BUCHHOLTZ A K. Agency relationships in family firms:Theory and evidence[J].{H}Organization Science,2001,(02):99-116.
  • 10SCHULZE W S,LUBATKIN M H,DINO R N. Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms[J].{H}JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING,2003,(04):473-490.

二级参考文献63

  • 1苏启林.基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业经理人行为选择[J].外国经济与管理,2007,29(2):51-56. 被引量:27
  • 2樊景立 郑伯埙.华人组织的家长式领导;一项文化观点的分析.本土心理学研究,2000,:127-180.
  • 3A. A. Jr. Cannella & W. Shen. So Close and Yet So Far: Promotion versus Exit for CEO Heirs Apparent[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2000, (144): 252-270.
  • 4J. Davis, H. Schoorman, F. D. & L. Donaldson. Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1997, (22): 20-47.
  • 5S. Chamu & L. Marianne. Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of Govemance[J]. Academy of Management Review,2003, (28): 397-415.
  • 6J. Hendry. The principal's Other Problems: Honest Incompetence and the Specification of Objectives[J]. Academy of Management Review, .9002, (27) : 98-113.
  • 7J. D. Westphal. Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increase in Structural Board Independence from Management[J] .Administrative Science Quarterly, 1998, (43): 511-537.
  • 8Nowak, M. J. & McCabe, M.. Information Costs and the Role of the Independent Corporate Director[J]. Corporate Governance, 2003, (11) : 300.
  • 9杨国枢.1993,《中国人的社会取向:社会互动的观点》.杨国枢,余安邦主编.《中国人的心理与行为:理论与方法篇》,台北:桂冠图书公司.
  • 10Hendry,K, and Kiel, G C. The role of the board in firm strategy: Integrating agency and organizational control perspectives[J]. Corporate Governance, 2004, 12: 500-520.

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部