中国台湾国民年金为何走向小整合体系？--一个历史制度论的分析

The Adoption of the Fragmented National Pension Insurance in Taiwan:A Historical Institutionalist Perspective

20世纪80年代中期之后,随着政治体制的转型以及民主化的开展,台湾地区社会政策迅速地扩张。其中,两个重要的社会立法即是1995年实施的《全民健康保险》和2008年实施的《国民年金保险》。前者建立了普及式健康保险制度;后者建立了分立式的年金保险体系。为何在民主化之后,台湾地区的国民年金体系并没有朝向普及式的年金体系整合,而是采取了所谓的小整合模式?研究利用历史制度主义概念,指出由于受到制度的历史遗绪以及选举制度的影响,原本依照职业类别分立的年金体系,更进一步地强化了国民年金保险体系的分立结构。20世纪90年代之后,民进党在特定的选举制度下,能够有效地利用年金议题在选举中争取台湾农民的政治支持;但是此政治策略却使得既有的年金体系更加分化,并且制造了新的政策既得利益者,限制了政策决策者在国民年金体系中的制度选择,因而使得国民年金体系逐渐地走向小整合模式。

Since the mid-1980s,Taiwan's social policy was significantly expanded due to political liberalisation. Two critical social legislations are the National Health Insurance( NHI) in 1995 and the National Pension Insurance( NPI) in 2008. The NHI is a universal health insurance scheme but the NPI is a fragmented pension scheme. Why did Taiwan adopt the fragmented NPI rather than a universal pension scheme after democratisation? Through the perspective of historical institutionalism,this paper argues that constrained by historical legacies and electoral institutions,the fragmented social insurance system was enhanced. After the 1990 s,under the MMD / SNTV,the DPP could mobilise political support from indigenous Taiwan Residents peasants by exploiting the pension issue. But this political strategy deepened the fragmentation of the social insurance system and created new policy beneficiaries. These factors constrained the institutional choice of the NPI and eventually led to the fragmented NPI scheme.