摘要
近年来,中国部分城市为缓解交通拥堵情况对车辆上牌实施配额管理。分析和比较了采用拍卖方式和采用摇号方式发放配额指标的不同经济影响,发现无论是从经济效率的角度还是从社会整体公平的角度(拍卖收入用于转移支付给低收入者的条件下),车牌拍卖政策都要优于车牌摇号政策。但车牌限额政策在解决道路使用中的负外部性问题时存在局限性,一种可以考虑的纠正负外部性的方法是征收交通拥堵费。
In recent years, some Chinese cities have sought to control motor vehicle ownership by means of vehicle quota system, whereby prospective vehicle buyers need to obtain a quota license before they can make their purchase. The local government allocates annual quota to the public each moth by means of an auction system or a license-plate lottery system. This paper argues that quota auction system is proffered both in the economic and social efficiency if auction revenue is reallocated to low income people. However, vehicle quota system(VQS) has its limitation in solving road transport externalities. In principle, "road pricing" such as Electronic Road Pricing system offers the first-best solution for optimizing congested road-traffic flows.
出处
《交通与运输》
2013年第H12期133-136,共4页
Traffic & Transportation
关键词
车牌限额政策
车牌拍卖
车牌摇号
道路交通负外部性
vehicle quota system(VQS)
License-plate auction system
License-plate lottery system
Road transport externalities