外国直接投资、国有企业与中国保护政策的内生性

A Political Economy Analysis of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment of China

本文以Grossman and Helpman(1994)的保护待售模型和Grossman and Helpman(1996)带有外国直接投资的扩展模型为基础,运用1993-2000年省际面板数据,使用最小二乘法和工具变量的估计方法,以及关键变量的多种计算口径估算了中国政府的目标函数。本文认为,政府对国有企业保护政策的内生性过程,是对外国直接投资所带来的收益与国有企业因为竞争加剧所带来的损失所进行的权衡。经验估计结果表明,在政府目标函数中,国有企业产出所占的比重是消费者福利所占比重的6倍。显示在国有企业面临外资企业竞争时,政府对国有企业的保护,一定程度上消减了消费者福利。

Based on the endogenous trade model of Grossman and Helpman （1994）, we extended it to a model with FDI. We view the political process in China as trading off between the social benefit brought by FDI and trade and the loss of state-owned enterprises due to increased competition incurred by foreign direct investment and trade. We use province panel data over the years 1993-2000 to get government objective function, and find the weight put on state-owned enterprises are 6 times that of the customer welfare.