摘要
制度建构者通常从维护法的实质正义价值视角出发,对弱者的权利做倾斜性保护安排。然而,作为一种对交易规则的人为性制度改观,权利的倾斜性配置因缺乏主体间长期的历史性博弈,容易产生被配置权利空置化、交易量减少、损害最差者利益与道德风险等制度积弊。而在遵循市场规律、不改变主体间固有交易规则的前提之下,责任的倾斜性配置通过对强者的责任而非弱者的权利进行倾斜性安排的方式,达到保护弱者利益与尊重主体行为自治二元协调的制度效果。
Lawmakers tend to make a tilt protection arrangement for the rights of the weak trom the perspective of maintaining the substantial justice value of law. However, as a kind of artificial system change of trading rules, such a favorable arrangement of rights is likely to produce such system maladies as configured right vacancy, transaction volume reduction, the damage of interests of the worst, and moral risks as a result of the lack of long historic game between the main bodies. But, the tilt configuration of duty, which obeys the market rules and does not change the existing trading rules between the main bodies, can achieve the effect of dual coordination system for protecting the interests of the weak and respecting the main body behavior through the tilt arrangement for the duty of the strong rather than for the rights of the weak.
出处
《广东商学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期89-96,共8页
Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies
基金
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(09XJC820010)
关键词
弱者
强者
权利倾斜性配置
责任倾斜性配置
法和经济学
the weak
the strong
the favorable allocation of legal rights
the tilt configuration of duty
justice
law and economics