转售价格维持的合谋效应与反垄断执法政策

The Collusion Effects and Antimonopoly Enforcement Policy of RPM

本文针对茅台、五粮液转售价格维持案,构建了转售价格维持促进合谋的理论模型,分析显示茅台、五粮液的最低转售价格维持具有承诺维持高价和促进合谋协议实施的效应。这是企业之间默契合谋的机制,应该受到《反垄断法》的禁止。中国最低转售价格维持的反垄断执法原则、效率抗辩配置、罚金水平确定依据等都需要改进。

Based on the RPM collusion model, we show that minimum resale price restriction practiced collectively by Moutai and Wnliangye is a mechanism to facilitate collusion. From the first antitrust case on resale price maintenance, we form the ideas that enforcement should confirm the rule of reason, offer firms opportunities to defend, ensure the basis of penalty level and strengthen the enforcement capacity of the antitrust agency.