摘要
鉴于民营化改革后的铁路运输公司仍具有区域垄断的性质,日本政府导入了区域间标尺竞争下的价格上限规制。该机制保留了收益率规制的某些特点,但通过横向比较和纵向比较引入了竞争机制。同样,为了保证居民的交通权,日本政府通过财政补贴和网运分离等制度设计,基本上维护了地方铁路网络的完整性。我国2013年铁路体制改革的实质是政企分开,改革本身并没有改变网运一体化下铁路运输的自然垄断性及其公益性,因此以政企分开为借口,完全实施市场机制是缺乏理论依据的。
In view of the monopoly nature of railway companies and the transportation rights of residents after privatiza- tion, the Japanese government introduced price-cap regulation along with yardstick competition among regions, and maintained the integrity of the local railway network through various institutional designs. China's railway reform in 2013 is essentially to separate government administration from business management, which does not change the monopoly and non-profit nature of the railway transportation. Consequently, implementing market mechanism in pricing under the excuse of reform is lack of the- oretical basis.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期91-96,共6页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics