摘要
笔者以沪深交易所上市的国有企业为样本,研究了国有企业的行政级别对政治关联的影响,以及政治关联对不同级别国有企业业绩的影响。结果发现,级别较高的国有企业的政治关联更多;政治关联对国有企业业绩的影响也因其行政级别而有所不同,政治关联对中央国有企业的业绩无显著影响,对地方国有企业业绩的影响则显著为正,这表明不同层级政府的激励目标和控制资源的能力不同,导致它所管辖的国有企业的政治关联在形成和影响上存在一定的差异。
Using samples of listed China' s state - owned enterprises ( SOE), this paper examines the relationship between political connection and SOEs' administrative hierarchy, and effect of SOEs' administrative hierarchy on the relationship between political con- nection and performance. We find that there are more political connections in SOEs of higher administrative hierarchy and the relation- ship between political connection and performance is affected by SOEs' administrative hierarchy. For central SOEs, political connec- tion has no effect on their performance, but for local SOEs, political connection has positive effect on their performance. Difference in formation and influence of SOEs' political connection implies that government of different levels has different political incentive and ca- pability of deploying economic resources.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期107-111,共5页
Economic Survey
基金
江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(PAPD)
关键词
行政级别
政治关联
政治收益
经营业绩
Administrative Hierarchy
Political Connection
Political Return
Operating Performance