考虑旁支付影响度的产品服务能力协调机制研究

Research on Product Service Capacity Coordination Mechanism with Side-payment Effect

产品服务能力协调逐渐成为制造服务运营管理研究的热点问题。笔者通过运用旁支付契约,在Cournot博弈基础上,建立了两个竞争性服务集成商之间的产品服务能力协调机制。研究表明,根据旁支付影响度取值变化,产品服务能力协调机制能够使服务集成商的收益都有所增加,同时能够实现双方收益分配的公平合理化,确保双方产品服务协作的稳定性。笔者通过秦川机床与大连机床企业运营实例,分析了旁支付契约在产品服务能力协调过程中的有效性。

Product service capacity coordination has gradually become front-burner issue of manufacturing service operation management research. Service capacity coordination mechanism between duopoly service integrators is constructed by use of side-payment based on Cournot game. According to value of side-payment changing, it shows that individual profit of two service integrators is better off by means of side-payment, revenue distribution is realized fairly and reasonably, so as to ensure stability of product service collaboration on both sides. Finally, the effectiveness of side-payment in product service capacity coordination is analyzed through enterprise opera- tion instances of Qinchuan and Dalian machine tool.