公司关系网络和高管薪酬:理论模型和实证

Relationship network of firms and executive compensation: Theoretical model and empirical findings

首先,以公司关系网络具备高管举荐功能作为潜在假设,构建数理模型,分析公司关系网络对高管薪酬水平和薪酬-绩效敏感度的影响.然后,选取2005-2010年我国上市公司为样本,借鉴社会网络分析方法量化公司关系网络的密度,对数理模型的推导结论进行实证分析.统计数据表明,我国约有83%的上市公司中至少有一位董事或总经理同时还在其它上市公司中担任董事或总经理职务.和理论模型的结论一致,实证检验结果表明公司关系网络的密度越大,高管的平均薪酬水平越高,但薪酬-绩效敏感度越低.这说明,公司关系网络对我国上市公司高管的薪酬激励安排有重要影响.

Theoretically, this study investigated the effects of the density of firms＇ relationship network on executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity by developing a theoretical model. Using a dataset of Chinese listed firms over the period 2005-2010, this study quantized the density of relationship network, and tested conclusions drawn by our theoretical model. The result shows that about 83% of Chinese listed firms have at least one director/CEO who also works as a director/CEO in other listed firms. Consistent with the theoretical model, this study also shows that the greater density of firms＇ relationship network is associated with significantly higher level of executive compensation, but significantly lower pay-performance sensitivity.