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基于政府型强互惠的共享意义制度化的均衡与内卷 被引量:1

Institutional Equilibrium and Involution of Sharing Significance Institutionalization Under the Model of Governmental Strong Reciprocity
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摘要 政府型强互惠将那些共享意义的习惯、习俗以具体的形式固定下来,实现制度化。当制度演化收敛于某一均衡点时,群体成员对于现行的规范体系不再有异动的要求,于是制度在均衡状态下表现为被简单的遗传复制,从而强互惠的政府就无须再对这些制度的强互惠投入成本,制度演化也自发地达成了均衡状态。在自发式内卷和强互惠式内卷两种力量共同作用下,制度会呈现长期低效率的锁定状态。 Institutionalization is the process that governmental strong reciprocity fixes habits and customs considered as the sharing significance in the population by the specific form.When the institutional evolution converges to an equilibrium point, population members no longer have the alteration requirements for current standard system.The institution is simple genetic replication under the equilibrium state.So governmental strong reciprocity needs no more costs inputs.The institutional evolution spontaneously reaches an equilibrium state. Under the influence of the two forces of spontaneous involution and strong reciprocated involution,institution shows the long term institutional blockage state of low efficiency.
作者 王覃刚
出处 《经济研究导刊》 2014年第1期182-186,共5页 Economic Research Guide
基金 湖北省教育厅科学技术研究项目(Q20111503)
关键词 政府型强互惠 制度化 制度内卷 governmental strong reciprocity institutionalization institutional involution
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