抽样检查下的供应链产品质量激励模型

Study on Supply Chain Product Quality Incentive Model in Sampling Inspection

考查一个供应商和一个销售商组成的供应链,利用委托-代理理论,建立一个基于抽样检查策略的产品质量成本效用模型,分析对称信息和非对称信息下销售商向供应商提供的最优激励价格,并讨论抽样检查策略对供应商质量安全努力水平和销售商采购高质量产品意愿的影响,从而为政府、行业和企业进行产品质量管理提供相关建议。

In this paper, we examined a supply chain composed of a supplier and a distributor, used the principal-agent theory to build a product quality cost-utility model based on the sampling inspection strategy, analyzed the optimal incentive prices quoted to the supplier by the distributor with symmetric and asymmetric information respeotively, and then discussed the influence of the sampling inspection strategy on the effort level of the supplier on quality and safety and the willingness of the distributor in providing high-quality products. At the end, we provided suggestions for the production quality management by the government, the industrv and the enterorises.