不同薪酬结构模式下煤矿安全监管合谋行为博弈分析

Game analysis on collusive behavior of coal mine safety supervision under different salary structure model

分别从固定工资和固定加安全绩效工资两种监理薪酬结构模式对煤矿企业与地方监管部门间的合谋行为以及中央监管部门的监督行为进行了博弈分析。研究发现,固定加安全绩效工资模式下的煤矿企业与地方监管部门合谋的最优概率较小。为了减少中央监管部门监督的概率,应当降低煤矿企业与地方监管部门合谋时的安全绩效工资。最后给出了降低合谋行为的发生和中央监管部门监督概率的应对措施。

In this paper, the game analysis on the collusive behavior between coal mine enterprise and local regula- tory authority and the supervision behavior of central regulatory authority was conducted from fixed salary model and fixed plus performance salary model. The results showed that the optimal probability of the collusive between coal mine enterprise and local regulatory authority is lower. In order to reduce the supervision probability of the central regulatory authority, the safety performance wage should be reduced when the collusion happen between the local regulatory authority and coal mine enterprise. Lastly, some corresponding measures were put forward to reduce the probability for the occurrence of collusion and supervision of central regulatory authority.