期刊文献+

一种以企业为主导的“产学研”集成创新模式——基于合作关系与控制权视角的建模分析 被引量:8

One integrated innovation mode with the “industry-university-research” based on enterprise-oriented: model-establishment and analysis from perspective of cooperative relation and controlling right
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摘要 有效的"产学研"合作技术创新模式是有力提升企业技术能力与创新能力的核心途径之一;同时也是高校提升自身科研成果转化率的关键。从创新的类型、主体以及创新过程中资源与能力优化配置的角度出发,归纳出两种典型"产学研"合作技术创新模式:以高校为主导兴建的企业模式以及以企业为主导的集成创新模式,并着重对后一种创新模式进行了分析。在此模式下,鉴于控制权与合作关系是影响创新效应的两个核心变量;将高校-企业合作关系分成两类:长期合作关系与短期合作关系,将控制权类型分为两种类型:集中控制与分散控制。在此基础上,着眼于"产学研"合作创新过程:企业从契约提供、合作创新过程的有效组织及产业竞争的系统维度,以动态博弈与委托-代理等理论为工具,建立了一个三阶段动态博弈模型,分别得出了短期合作关系下集中控制、短期合作关系下分散控制、长期合作关系下集中控制、长期合作关系下分散控制四种不同情形的子博弈完美纳什均衡解,并对每种情形及其博弈结果进行了细化分析。最后,从双边关系的类型、控制权类型以及委托-代理效应三个不同维度,从静态与动态两个方面比较分析了创新的知识投入、工资、产量、价格、利润等均衡变量的差异性。 Effective innovation mode with the "industry university research" cooperation is one of the most important routes for the enterprises to improve its technological capabilities and innovation capacities, meanwhile it' s also the key for the high college to im prove transformation rates for its own research outcomes. From the perspective of innovation types, main innovator dependent and the optimal resources and capability allocation with the innovation process, two innovation modes with the " industry university re search" cooperation are concluded : one is enterprise established mode based on the high college oriented, the other is the integrat ed innovation mode based on the enterprise oriented, which is focused to be researched in this dissertation. In this mode, because the cooperative relation and controlling right are the two core variables in determining innovation effects, the cooperative relation between u niversity and enterprise is divide into two types: long term cooperation relation and short term relation, and the controlling right is also divided into two ones: centralized controlling and decentralized controlling. Based on mentioned above, focusing on the cooperative innovation process of "industry university research" : systematic dimension including contract providing, well organized for the cooperation innovation process and the industrial competition by enterprise, by using the tools such as the game theory and the principal agent theory, one three stage dynamic model is established, four sub game perfect nash equilibriums are also concluded under the conditions which contain the centralized( or decentralized) controlling under the short term (or long term) cooperative relation re spectively,and the detailed analysis for each condition and its game outcome are also made respectively . Finally, from three dimension including cooperative relation, controlling right, and the principle agent effect, some parameters equilibrium outcomes such as the in novation knowledge input, salary, production, prices and profits, and its differences are made from static and dynamic perspective.
出处 《科学学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第1期130-139,共10页 Studies in Science of Science
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJCZH125) 浙江省软科学研究计划资助项目(2013C35056) 浙江省教育科学规划重点资助项目(SB105)
关键词 “产学研” 创新模式 动态博弈 委托-代理 合作关系 控制权 industry - university - research innovation modes dynamic games principal - agent cooperative relations controllingright.
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参考文献17

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