均值-标准差控制下的供应链渠道Stackelberg模型

Stackelberg Model of Supply Chain Channel with Mean-standard Deviation Control

本文研究了在均值-标准差方法控制下的一个具有风险偏好(风险规避、风险中性、风险喜好)零售商与两个风险中性供应商之间供应链渠道协作和竞争。首先,在考虑零售商风险偏好下,提出了供应商联盟与非联盟两种情况中的各方处于Stackelberg-leader或Stackelberg-follower不同权利地位时各决策模式及其对应决策模型;然后,通过对比分析各决策模式最优解及深入分析零售商风险偏好对各渠道成员最优决策影响,得到了基于零售商风险偏好下的供应链渠道各成员的领导者地位将较大影响各方期望效用,而对供应链渠道整体期望效用最大化并无影响,同时,零售商过度喜好风险或者规避风险都将会对供应链整体期望效用造成致命伤害;最后,通过数值分析进一步验证了前面结论。

The paper considers a supply chain including two risk-neutral suppliers and retailer who has different risk prefer- ences （risk averse, risk neutral and risk prone）. First, each Stackelberg model for different operational mode of two suppliers-- competitive mode and cooperative mode, is put forward. The impact of risk references on expected utility of supply chain parties is discussed under different operational mode. Then, through mean-variance analysis, the theoretical analysis suggests that a supply chain member＇s position as a Stackelberg leader will increase its expected utility greatly, but has no influence on the expected utility of the supply chain. It is also interesting to find that both a very risk averse retailer and a very risk prone retailer are all deadly harm to the expected utility of the supply chain although a slightly risk prone retailer will improve the supply chain＇s expected utility. Finally, it also p roofs the result of the theoretical analysis through numerical analysis.