地方政府间竞争：土地出让及其策略选择--来自中国省级面板数据(1993--2009年)的经验证据

The Competition among Local Governments: Land Leasing and Strategy Choices: with Empirical Evidences from Provincial Panel Data in China(1993-2009)

分税制改革改变了地方政府的竞争行为,使得地方之间对资本的竞争变得异常激烈。土地廉价出让是各地吸引资本的重要手段之一,而引资竞争在一定程度上表现为"占地竞赛"。问题是,土地廉价出让的竞争策略具有怎样的特征?运用反应函数对1993—2009年中国省级面板数据的计量分析表明:各省区土地出让政策存在明显的空间策略模仿行为,并且在行为上存在跨期影响,在策略上存在路径依赖性;从土地出让的不同类型看,划拨出让表现为出让宗数竞争,而协议出让表现为出让面积竞争;从区域来看,东、中、西部的土地出让政策均存在明显的策略模仿行为,其中东部地区土地出让竞争更为激烈。

The tax-sharing system reform has changed the local governments ' competition behavior, which leads to fierce regional competition in capital. Leasing land cheaply is one of the most important means for the local government to attract capital. As a result, the competition in attracting capital becomes a ‘ land-occupation game' to some degree. The question is that, what are the characters about the competition strategy of leasing land cheaply? Based on reaction function and with the provincial panel data from1993 to 2009 in China, the paper does a positive analysis and gets three conclusions.(1) The policy of leasing land cheaply has obvious spatial strategic imitative behavior, which has inter-temporal effect on behavior and path-dependence on strate-gy.(2) From the vision angle of the type on land leasing, the distributing-type land leasing reflects competi-tion in the quantity of land leasing, while the agreement-type land leasing reflects competition on the area of land leasing.(3) In terms of region, the policies of leasing land cheaply applied in the east, middle and west parts of China all have obvious strategic imitative behavior, and the land-leasing competition is much fiercer in the east.