意向性在心灵哲学转向中的意义

Significance of intentionality in turn to philosophy of mind

为了考察塞尔的心灵哲学对日常语言哲学的突破,从4个方面分析"意向性"概念在立场转变中的核心意义,即对塞尔意向性概念的建设性意义作重点分析;讨论其不同于胡塞尔思想的地方;批判地讨论从这种概念出发对一些基本哲学问题的回答效力。研究认为,塞尔的意向性概念为其心灵哲学提供了一个很好的自然主义基础,然而同时也无法避免自然主义的难题。

To study the breakthrough of John Searle＇s philosophy of mind in ordinary language philosophy, the core role of intentionality in the turn of standpoint is studied from four aspects. First, the background of this approach is reviewed. Second, the constructive function of intentionality is analyzed. Third, the difference between Searle＇s idea about intentionality and Husserl＇s is discussed. Fourth, the capability of resolving fundamental questions through such a point of view is critically discussed. This paper believes that Searle＇s idea about intentionality provides a naturalistic foundation for the philosophy of mind, yet the difficulties faced by naturalism can not be avoided.