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董事高管责任保险、权益资本成本与上市公司再融资能力 被引量:42

Directors' & Officers' liability insurance,Cost of Equity Capital and Capacity of Seasoned Equity Offerings
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摘要 基于公司治理角度,使用2002-2012年沪深引进董事高管责任保险的上市公司为样本,考察了董事高管责任保险、权益资本成本和上市公司再融资能力三者之间的相互关系。研究表明:董事高管责任保险与上市公司的再融资能力负相关,与权益资本成本呈显著正相关关系;权益资本成本在董事高管责任保险和上市公司再融资能力影响机制中发挥中介作用。具体地,投资者因规避责任保险机制庇护下公司高管自利行为可招致的风险,导致上市公司权益资本成本增加,从而降低了公司再融资能力。 Based on the perspective of corporate governance, this paper analyzed the relationships among D&O insurance, cost of equity and the capacity of seasoned equity offerings of listed companies. The result of the empirical research shows that: D&O insurance bought by listed companies is negatively related to their capacity of seasoned equity offerings, and significantly positively correlated with the cost of equity capital of the companies; the cost of equity capital plays an intermediary role through which the D&O insurance exert an influence on companies capacity of seasoned equity offerings. It means that, investors by increasing their expected rate of return which will increase the cost of equity in order to and decrease the ability to avoid the investment risk caused by directors and officers' opportunistic behavior. As a result, the ability of companies' seasoned equity offering fails.
出处 《财经理论与实践》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第1期39-44,102,共7页 The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71062009) 教育部新世纪人才支持计划项目(NCET-10-0123)
关键词 董事高管责任保险 权益资本成本 再融资能力 D&O insurance Cost of Equity Capital Seasoned Equity Offerings
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参考文献27

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