业绩波动性与高管薪酬契约选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Volatility of Performance and Compensation Contracts:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

新兴与转型经济的中国,其政治、经济环境与发达国家存在显著差异。突出表现之一就是,隐性的在职消费契约在高管激励体系中发挥着巨大作用。因此,薪酬契约组合中在职消费与货币薪酬契约如何达到均衡就成为一个重要问题。本文认为国有企业中,经营不确定性是在职消费与货币薪酬契约相对关系的重要影响因素。业绩波动性较大时,在职消费契约可以更有效地降低信息不对称带来的代理成本,因而在契约组合中会更多被采用,这一推论得到了本文实证结果的支持;结果还显示,这一关系在保护性行业中更为明显。此外,本文首次提供了在职消费契约与货币薪酬契约灵活性比较的直接证据。本文的研究为Marino和Zabojnik(2008)的理论推导提供了一定的经验支持和扩展。

In emerging and transferring economy countries such as China, the legal, economic environment is different from the developed countries. One of the most prominent aspects is the contract of perks is quite important in managers＇ incentives, so the study of influencing factors on the relation of perks contract and cash compensation contract is necessary. Compared to cash compensation contract, in companies whose volatility of performance is large, the perks contract can reduce the agency costs greatly, so it will be used more in the whole combination. The empirical evidences support theoretical analysis. The results also show the relation is stronger in protected industries. In addition, we offer the empirical evidence on the flexibility of contracts of perks and cash compensation for the first time, and empirical supports for Marino and Zabojnik （2008）＇s model.