期刊文献+

清算机构场外衍生品集中清算风险监管研究 被引量:3

Risk Management in CCC Houses of Over-the-Counter Derivatives
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摘要 场外衍生交易清算机构高度集中了场外衍生交易的交易对手风险和操作风险,若丧失清偿能力可能引发或加剧系统性风险。金融监管机构应当在衍生交易清算机构的成员资格、风险管理、违约管理等方面对其加强风险监管。监管机构应在清算机构公平公开的成员准入要求与控制成员对清算机构和其他成员带来风险之间实现平衡,对同时参加若干清算机构的成员施加较高的最低资本要求;加强清算机构的流动性风险和投资风险监管,要求清算机构建立危机后业务恢复、清算持续机制;在违约管理制度设计中应避免追加保证金要求引发成员的流动性危机乃至加剧金融系统内流动性危机,以及因非违约成员对违约基金增加出资限额不明确而产生的成员之间的风险传染效应。 Counterparty and operational risks of over-the-counter derivatives concentrate in CCC Houses and make them fragile to systemic risks. The authorities should adopt more strict standards in eligibility requirements, risk management and default management of derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs). The eligibility requirements should balance between more members and controlling systemic risks caused by additional members and impose minimum capital requirement for cleating members trading in multiple CCC houses. The authorities should impose more strict regulation standards over liquidity risk and investment risk and require the DCOs to establish an emergence mechanism to continue settlements in case of a crisis. With respect to managing defaulting risks, the authorities should avoid additional margin requirements which could cause liquidity crisis within members or even the financial system and amplify systemic risk between all members
作者 陈兰兰
出处 《金融监管研究》 2014年第1期77-97,共21页 Financial Regulation Research
基金 2012年教育部人文社科青年基金项目"信用违约互换集中清算机制研究"(项目编号:12YJC820007)的阶段性研究成果
关键词 衍生交易清算机构 成员资格 风险管理 违约管理 Derivatives Clearing Organization Participation Requirements Risk Management DefaultManagement
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参考文献2

  • 1HM Treasury and Financial Services Authority.Reforming OTC Derivative Markets:A UK Perspective[]..2009
  • 2CPSS-IOSCO Technical Committee.Recommendations for Central Counterparties(CCPs)[]..2004

同被引文献22

  • 1沈炳熙.大力发展债券场外市场[J].中国金融,2004(17):23-24. 被引量:3
  • 2George G Kaufman.Too big to fail in banking: What remains?[J]. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance . 2002 (3)
  • 3Griffith,Sean J.Governing Systemic Risk:Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses. Emory Law Journal . 2012
  • 4Alistair Milne.OTC central counterparty clearing: Myths and reality. Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions . 2012
  • 5Jeremy C.Kress.Credit Default Swaps,Clearinghouses,and Systemic Risk:Why centralized counterparties must have access toCentral Bank Liquidity. Harvard Journal on Legislation . 2011
  • 6Johnson,Kristin N.Governing Financial Markets:Regulating Conflicts. Washington Law Review . 2013
  • 7Craig,P.the Economics of Central Clearing:Theory and Practice. ISDA Discussion Papers Series No.1 . 2011
  • 8Freeman,Edward.Strategic Management:A Stakeholder Approach. . 2010
  • 9Carter,Colin B,Lorsch,Jay W.Back to the Drawing Board. . 2003
  • 10Johnson,Kristin N.Clearinghouse Governance:Moving Beyond Cosmetic Reform. Brooklyn Law Review . 2012

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