中小企业联保贷款的机制设计之惑——基于上海钢贸业的案例研究

The Puzzle on the Mechanism Design of Middle and Small Business' Group Lending——Case Study on Shanghai's Steel Trade Industry

中小企业联保贷款违约的集体爆发,让人们对宏观经济产生的系统性风险颇多责难。但除去系统性风险,联保贷款本身的机制设计是否存在问题呢?首先,本文基于联保贷款的有效机理,修正了相关假设,分析结果表明较小的监督成本、胜任的监管专业能力和足够的违约惩罚是联保贷款有效的必要条件。其次,经过对上海钢贸行业的案例研究,发现贷款小组成员监管专业能力有限和违约惩罚弱化是联保贷款无效的原因。最后,根据以上结论给出了相应政策建议。

Facing so much loan defaults in the middle and small business＇ group lending, people felt that the system risk should be responsible for that. Is there any problem on the mechanism design of group lending？ First, this paper fixed the hypothesis, and found that low monitoring cost, enough professional monitoring ability and high default punishment are the conditions should be satisfied. Second, after the case study on Shanghai＇s steel trade industry, it found the limitation of monitoring ability and the weakening of the punishing on the defaults are the reasons for the inefficiency of the group lending. Last, some suggestions are given according to the masons.