从外延主义到HPC——对自然种类的形而上学分析

From Extensionalism to HPC: A Metaphysical Analysis of Natural Kinds

关于自然种类的外延主义把自然种类视为现实对象的函项,自然科学研究不断得出结论对此提出质疑。为此,经典名称语义理论以性质解释自然种类的外延,但遭遇性质认知的困难。HPC则集中于自然种类的解释作用界定自然种类,给出自然种类之稳定存在的一面。文章认为HPC和杂乱实在论都对自然种类做功能主义的把握,接受HPC则有必要接受杂乱实在论,这种必要性可见于区分自然种类与非自然种类的努力。

Traditionally, extensionalism views natural kinds as functions of real objects. However, the idea is increasingly challenged by new scientific findings. Some classical theories concerning the meaning of names explain the extension of a natural kind with certain properties, but this approach is blocked by the difficulty in knowing properties. HPC defines natural kinds on the basis of the role they play in explaining things, and thus ensures their stable existence. This paper argues that both HPC and promiscuous realism interpret natural kinds in terms of functionalism. To take HPC, we need to follow promiscuous realism, and this necessity can be found in attempts to distinguish natural kinds from non-natural kinds.