摘要
裁量收缩是指行政机关享有效果裁量时,在一定条件下仍然负有作为或不作为义务;不履行该义务构成违法,私人(不限于行政相对人)的重要法益因此而受他人或自然力侵害的,有权请求国家赔偿。裁量收缩理论的前提是裁量一元论,基础是国家的基本权利保护义务。裁量收缩的要件只是一个判断框架,其实质内容是对相互冲突的基本权利与行政便宜进行比较衡量。这种比较衡量通过法律的合宪性解释而内化为从个案具体情况出发补充的裁量基准(为个案量身打造的裁量基准)。裁量收缩理论的最终目标是个案正义,但是,它既不能超越法律(不能无视裁量授权规范的保护意图和行政权限与任务的法定性),也不能径直解决损害赔偿责任的分担问题。
Discretion shrink means that although administrative organs have the discretion power, under certain condition they still bear the obligation of feasance or nonfeasance. The nonperformance of that obligation is against law. Anyone (not limited to the administrative counterpart) whose important legal interest thereby is infringed by others or natural power, has the right to claim state compensation. The premise of Discretion Shrink Theory is discretion monism and its foundation is the protection obligation of basic rights from the state. The essentials for discretion shrink are just a judge framework. Its essence is the comparison and tradeoff of the conflicted basic rights and convenience of administration. This kind of comparison and tradeoff has been interiorized as the supplementary discretion criterion proceeds from individual case (discretion criterion for individual case) by the interpretation of constitutionality of law. The ultimate purpose of discretion shrink is the justice of particular case. However, it cannot exceed law (cannot ignore the protective intent of discretion power authorization and the legality of administrative jurisdiction and duty), as well as directly solve the problem of share on the issue of compensation liability.
出处
《中国法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期125-143,共19页
China Legal Science
基金
国家社科基金(一般项目)<我国行政裁量基准制度研究>(批准号:11BFX128)的阶段性成果