国企高管薪酬与公司过度投资:理论模型及其经济后果

SOE Executive Compensation and Corporate Overinvestment: Theoretical Model and Economic Consequences

实证研究表明,国有企业的过度投资行为不仅源于代理问题,而且与高管的薪酬激励也密切相关。高管薪酬与过度投资之间是如何相互联系的呢?本文首先对高管过度投资的背景进行了分析,再建立高管薪酬追求与董事会监管之间的博弈模型,认为国企高管倾向于采用过度投资来实现私人利益最大化。在此基础上,进一步建立效用函数模型,从原因和经济后果两方面剖析和证明了高管薪酬追求与国企过度投资规模之间的有关命题,最后提出了政策建议。

Empirical studies have shown that SOE＇s overinvestment is not only from agency problems, but also connected with executive compensation. However, the key question here is how does executive compensation relate to overinvestment？ This paper would firstly analyze the background of executive＇s overinvestment decisions, and then pursued through a game model. It proves that SOE executives tend to use overinvestment to maximize private benefit. On this basis, the paper further establish the utility function model, and analyze some propositions from both the causes and economic consequences of executive compensation and the scale of overinvestment. Finally come up with some policy suggestions.