公司治理对经理人自利动机与费用粘性的影响研究

A Study of the Impact of Corporate Governance on Managers' Self-Interest Motivation and Cost Stickiness

文章以我国2001-2012年持续上市且经理人有自利动机的公司为样本,研究了公司治理机制能否通过制约经理人的自利动机,进而对费用粘性造成影响。研究结果发现,在公司治理水平较高的公司,经理人的自利动机受到制约,从而导致较低水平的费用粘性;而在公司治理水平较低的公司,经理人的自利动机比较明显,费用粘性也相对较高。进一步研究发现,公司治理水平与公司价值呈显著的正相关关系。上述研究结论对如何加强公司治理以制约经理人自利动机从而减轻代理问题,如何加强费用控制以提高公司价值有现实的指导意义。

Taking as the samples China＇s companies which are continuously listed from 2001 to 2012 and whose managers have self-interest motivations, this paper studies whether corporate gover- nance mechanism can affect cost stickiness through restriction of the managers＇ self-interest incentive. The results show that companies with higher corporate governance level can restrict managers＇ self-in- terest incentives, resulting in a cost stickiness of lower level; while in companies with lower corporate governance level, the managers＇ self-interest incentives is obvious and the cost stickiness is also at a higher level. Further study reveals that there is a significantly positive correlation between the level of corporate governance and corporate values. These conclusions have practical significance in strengthen- ing corporate governance to alleviate the agency problem by restricting the managers＇ self-interest in- centive and in strengthening cost control so as to enhance the corporate values.