两级供应链减排与促销的合作策略

Cooperative strategy of carbon emissions reduction and promotion in a two-echelon supply chain

首先假设在由零售商主导的供应链中,制造商的低碳声誉和零售商的促销都能增加产品的需求,减排对制造商的低碳声誉有正面影响;然后运用微分博弈理论,比较了不合作、成本分担契约以及合作3个契约对供应链成员的影响.研究发现,制造商和零售商的促销及减排水平在合作契约下最高,但供应链的总价值在合作契约下最大是有条件的.当存在合作价值时,为了使制造商和零售商获得更多的价值设计了利润共享契约.

Assuming a supply chain led by the retailer consisted with a manufacturer and a retailer, the manufacturer＇s low- carbon goodwill and the retailer＇s promotion can increase the market demand for the products. By supposing that reducing carbon emissions of the manufacturer has a positive effect on its low-carbon goodwill, and that the low carbon emissions is made as a means of product differentiation to deal with the product homogeneity, the profits of the members of the supply chain among the non-cooperation, the cost-sharing contract and the cooperation are compared. And it is found that the optimal carbon reduction level and the optimal promotion level are the highest in cooperation situation, but implementing the cooperative contract is conditional. In the cooperative situation, a profit-sharing contract is designed in order to smoothly implement the coooerative contract.