管理人持基的投资基金治理效应:理论分析与经验证据

Effects of Managerial Ownership on Fund Governance:Theoretic Analysis and Empirical Evidence in China

针对我国契约型投资基金管理人与持有人之间的委托代理冲突,运用理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法,从基金管理人努力水平、投资组合风险选择、运营管理成本和影响管理人持基因素四个角度,考察我国基金管理人持基激励效应。研究发现,增加基金管理人持基比例可改善证券投资基金的绩效,降低基金投资组合风险,但管理运营成本没有显著下降;管理人持基水平受到基金规模、成立年限、β值、市场指数变动方向的影响。

This paper uses both theoretical analysis and empirical test to analyze the efficiency of the manager ownership to eliminate the Principal-agent Conflict between the fund manager and the investor in China. It is studies from four aspects： the fund managers＇ effort, fund portfolio risk, fund operation cost and the factors which influence the managerial ownership. We find that higher managerial ownership can increase the performance of the fund and reduce the portfolio risk. But it has little effect on the fund operation cost. Our studies also reveal that the factors that influence managerial ownership include the fund size, fund beta, length of service and market state.