“省直管县”弱化了资源的城市偏向性配置吗?——财政转移支付视角

Do Counties Directly Controlled by Province-level Governments Weaken the Urban-bias Allocation of Resources:From the Perspective of Fiscal Transfer Payments

中国长期存在的"城乡二元分治"制度导致资源配置呈现明显的城市偏向特征,加剧了城乡不平等,也不利于社会和谐。基于财政转移支付的视角,文章研究发现,"省直管县"改革通过以下两个机制扭转了资源的城市偏向性配置:第一,"省直管县"改革提高了县乡经济发展激励,增加了县乡公共服务支出责任并提高了县级地区资金匹配能力,有利于县乡在既有分配规则下获取更多的财政转移支付。第二,"省直管县"改善了基层政府的财政地位,减少了上级政府的资金截留;同时使县辖区公共需求向上的传递渠道更加顺畅,从外部环境上为其获得更多的财政转移支付创造了条件。此外,多维度的检验也为深入了解财政转移支付分配规则的缺陷以及如何增进财政转移支付分配的公平性提供了经验证据。

lhe long-term dual urban-rural system in Ghma results in the obvious urban-t）las characteristic of resources allocation, exacerbating the urban-rural inequality and also being harmful to social harmony. From the perspective of fiscal transfer payments, this paper arrives at the conclusion that the reform of counties directly controlled by province-level governments turns the urban-bias resources allocation over through two mechanisms as follows： on the one hand, the reform increases the incentives of economic development at county and town levels, their re- sponsibilities of public services spending at county and town levels and county-level fund matc- hing abilities and is conducive to more fiscal transfer payments at county and town levels under existing allocation rule; on the other hand, the reform improves the fiscal status of local govern- ments, reduces funds intercepted by governments at higher levels, makes upward delivery channel of count-level public demand more smooth and creates a helpful external environment for the counties to get more fiscal transfer payments. In addition, a multi-dimensional test also provides evidence for deep understanding of the defects of allocation rules of fiscal transfer payments and how to improve the fairness of fiscal transfer payments allocation.