小微企业社会保险参保行为研究——以镇江市为例

为研究小微企业社会保险的参保行为,文章从宏观上分析了我国小微企业社会保险参保现状,在调查镇江市小微企业社会保险参保现状的基础上,依据演化经济学理论建立政府与企业间的博弈得益矩阵,从政府监管的角度分析小微企业参保违规行为形成的动因。同时,从小微企业自身经营状况的角度分析小微企业选择性参保、不足额投保等违规行为发生的原因,进而提出规范小微企业参保行为的政策建议:一是激励小微企业主动参保;二是提高小微企业和员工对参保的认识;三是加强政府监管力度。

The article is to research the participation of micro and small enterprises in social insurance, analyze China＇ s micro and small enterprises＇ social insurance status macroscopically. Based on the survey of micro and small enterprises＇ participation in social insurance in Zhenjiang city, it adopts the theory of evolutionary economics to build the benefit matrix game between government and enterprises and analyze the causes of micro and small enterprise＇ s violations on participation in social in- surance from the perspective of governmental supervision. Simultaneously, it analyzes the causes of micro and small enter- prises＇ violations on selective and underinsured participation in social insurance from the perspective of the operating status of the enterprises. In addition, the article gives some policy recommendations to regulate the participation of micro and small enterprises in social insurance, including encouraging micro and small enterprises to participate in social insurance actively, improving the realization of micro and small enterprises and employees on the participation in social insurance, and strengthening the efforts of government supervision.