摘要
传统中国社会的统治者围绕救灾制度,创造了禳灾制度和减灾制度两种模式。它们无论是在使用的次序、数量以及不同时期的选择上,都有较为明显的差异。而这种差异的形成与统治者对其合法性地位的维护有着密切的关系。经济学模型的探讨显示,这一选择与灾民的期盼相反,这往往成为引发灾民起义,进而导致王朝更迭的重要因素。
Dealing with disasters, dominators of Chinese traditional society practiced two institutions for disaster relief operations -- institution of exorcising disasters and institution of reducing disasters. These insti- tutions are obviously different in sequence, number and era. And the differences have a close relationship with the dominators who try to consolidate their legitimacy. As the economic model shows in this thesis, dominators' choice is usually inconsistent with the expectations of refugees, even more, it may lead to uprising and the change of dynasties.
出处
《中国农史》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期67-75,共9页
Agricultural History of China
基金
国家社科基金项目"历史时期气候变化对华北地区粮食生产与价格波动的影响"(项目号:13CJL008)
北京市社科基金项目"清代北京地区粮价波动与社会应对"(项目号:12LSC014)
关键词
灾害
禳灾制度
减灾制度
disasters
institution of exorcising disasters
institution of reducing disasters