基于效用函数的煤矿企业安全投资博弈研究

Gaming Model of Safety Investment in Mine Enterprises Based on Utility Function

煤矿生产具有特殊性,其中包含了安全生产监管部门和煤矿企业间的协调,煤矿企业间的竞争关系,以及煤矿企业内部的生产和安全投资决策等。近年来,由于煤炭生产原材料和煤炭价格都在大幅度上涨,煤矿生产企业为了节省成本并追求自身利益的最大化而展开安全投资博弈,结果发生了频发的矿难事故。本文重点基于煤矿技术水平和生产成本建立安全投资博弈模型,研究安全投资背后的利益博弈,以助于安全投资方面的决策,增加安全意识和监管,改善安全生产状况。

In mining industry, coal mines are faced with many problems such as coordination between the mining enter- prises and the safety administration, market competition among the mining enterprises, decision-making in production against safety investment, and so on. On the other hand, both the costs of raw material and coal prices have been going up in recent years. In order to reduce the cost and maximize the profit, the coal mine enterprises are gaming in the safety investment, which results in mine accidents. Based on the game modeling with the measurements of technology and cost, this paper presents a safety investment analysis for decision makers to enhance the safety awareness, strengthen supervi- sion and improve the production and safety status.