考虑广告主信誉的两阶段GSP机制研究

Research on the Two-stage GSP Mechanism with Advertiser Reputation

在国内,关键词拍卖机制的逐利本质诱发了大量的虚假广告,引发了公众的广泛争议;拥有高报价的广告主并不总是给搜索引擎用户好的用户体验,这些问题已成为亟需解决的重要问题。本文提出了一种既考虑广告主信誉又考虑用户福利的两阶段可信有效竞价关键词拍卖机制,通过与GSP单纯竞价拍卖机制进行比较,我们分析了广告主的均衡竞价策略、拍卖的均衡收益和效率。结果表明,本文的拍卖机制不仅有利于促进广告主提高信誉,在提高搜索引擎的长期均衡收益和拍卖效率方面也有一定的优势。

In our country , the profit-driven nature of the advertising position auction mechanism induced a large number of false advertising , and triggered a wide public controversy ;advertisers with high bids do not always give a good user experience of search engine users , these problems have become important issues need to be resolved . This paper presents a two -stage credible position auction mech-anism , considering not only the reputation of advertisers but also the experience of users . We analyze the equilibrium bidding strategy of the advertisers , the equilibrium benefits of the search engine and the efficiency of position auction , comparing with the mechanism of rank-ing only by bid . The results indicate our mechanism is conducive to improve advertiser reputation , and also has advantage in raising engine＆#39;s long-term balanced revenue and auction efficiency .