摘要
目的研究制药企业在选择药物不良反应率时的行为。方法博弈论方法。结果与结论制药企业在选择药物不良反应率时,会考虑以下选择,若隐瞒药物真实的、较高的不良反应率虽然会存在一定的不良反应率发生的事件概率,但可以实现更多的销售,即使发生了严重的不良反应事件,扩大的销售额或许也可以弥补这些损失;而若如实的公布这些不良反应率则有可能会影响销售,若降低不良反应率则会增加成本。因此,制药企业会在隐瞒不良反应率和降低不良反应率之间进行博弈,而患者则会根据药物不良反应率来选择药物,也能制约制药企业对药物不良反应率的选择。
Objective To study the pharmaceutical enterprises′behaviors in the selection of adverse drug reaction rate.Methods The game theory.Results and Conclusion The decision maker of the pharmaceutical enterprises in the selection of adverse drug reaction rate,wil consider the folowing options,if they conceal the truth and higher rate of the adverse reaction,though there are some adverse effect rate of event probability,but they can achieve more sales,even if there was a serious adverse event,expand sales may also can make up for these losses;and if they announce these adverse reaction rate,that is likely to afect sales,if they have to reduce adverse reaction rate,that wil increase the cost,therefore,pharmaceutical companies wil make game between concealing adverse reaction rate and reduce the adverse reaction rate,while patients have to choose drugs according to the adverse drug reaction rate,that can also control the pharmaceutical enterprises of adverse drug reaction rate selection.
出处
《中国药物经济学》
2014年第1期20-22,共3页
China Journal of Pharmaceutical Economics
关键词
制药企业
患者
药物不良反应率
博弈
Pharmaceutical enterprises
Patients
Drug adverse reaction rate
Game