论股票期权激励下的风险报酬

On the Venture Reward under the Stock Share Option Incentive

从数学方面推证传统的经营者薪酬激励形式,难以使经营者达到在风险项目投资时投资报酬与投资风险的对称性,又总是呈现为投资报酬小于投资风险,以致于经营者大多放弃或不积极地进行风险投资。而实施包含股票期权激励形式在内的新的经营者薪酬激励形式可以大幅提高经营者在风险投资后的投资报酬,并使得经营者得到的风险投资收益与承担的风险相对称,进而提升经营者进行风险投资的动机,激励经营者选择风险投资行为,实现企业所有者和经营者的"双赢"。

It is difficult for the traditional operators salary incentive form derived by mathematics to make the operator reach the symmetry between investment return and investment risk of the risk project investment, and it always appears as return on investment less than the investment risk, so that operators are largely abandoned or don＇t actively conduct the risk investment. The implementation of new operators salary incentive form including stock options incentive form can significantly improve operators＂ investment reward after the venture investment, and make operators gain relative risk investment retums and risk, and then raise operators＂ motivation to carry through the risk investment, stimulate operators selecting the risk investment behavior, and achieve the ＂win-win＂ between business owners and operators.