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Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: A Sociological Analysis Based on Chinese Experience 被引量:1

公司治理与企业绩效——基于中国经验的社会学分析(英文)
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摘要 Based on the 1997-2007 panel data of 676 listed companies and in-depth interviews with the senior executives, independent directors, fund managers and securities analysts of these companies, this paper tries to analyze the relationship between corporate govemance and firm performance from a sociological perspective. The results show that the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the Chinese institutional environment is sharply different from the predictions of the agency theory. The empirical findings from China lend strong support to the new institutional argument that "besf' corporate governance practices are socially "constructed" by various social forces and interests groups in specific social, political and cultural contexts, and how "good" a corporate governance practice is depends to a large extent on whether it fits in with the institutional environment in which it is embedded. There exists no universally "best" model of corporate governance across the world. Our empirical sociological study based on Chinese experience offers new perspectives and evidence for deconstructing the global myth ofcoroorate ~ovemance. 基于676家上市公司1997-2007年间的面板数据及对上市公司高管、独立董事、基金经理和证券分析师等的深度访谈资料,分析公司治理和企业绩效之间的关系,揭示在中国制度背景下与代理理论的预测颇为不同的公司治理与企业绩效的关系模式。而所谓的"最佳"公司治理做法是在特定社会、政治、文化等制度环境下各种复杂社会力量和利益群体进行"建构"的结果,其作用的发挥在很大程度上取决于是否契合所在的制度环境,因此,并不存在普适的"最佳"公司治理模式。基于中国经验的社会学实证研究,为解构这一世界性公司治理迷思提供了新视角和证据。
作者 杨典
机构地区 Institute of Sociology
出处 《Social Sciences in China》 2014年第1期44-67,共24页 中国社会科学(英文版)
基金 the Shum Fellowship of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University the Young Scholar Start-up Research Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences the MIT-Harvard Economic Sociology Seminar the participants provided helpful comments and suggestions
关键词 corporate governance firm performance NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM agency theory property rights theory 公司治理 企业绩效 新制度主义 代理理论 产权理论
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