当代美德伦理背景下的休谟“同情”原则研究

On Hume's Sympathy in the Context of Contemporary Virtue Ethics

利用"同情"来解释道德问题是休谟道德哲学的独特标志。休谟的"同情"其实是用想象来再现他人的某种情感。通过对主观"同情"进行修正,不把"同情"局限在解释人与人之间情感的交流上,而看作是社会全体成员共同具有的一种倾向,从而使之成为普遍的道德判断依据和贯穿其道德哲学的线索。有了"同情"这种人与人之间的共鸣和互感,使人们超越自爱之心,"仁慈"和"正义"的道德感和美德才得以形成。在当代美德伦理复兴的进程中,美德伦理学的任务在于重新确认道德行为者的心理情感倾向和内在的行为动机,但却遭遇诸多批评和质疑。重新回顾"同情"原则,依赖情感机制,对于美德伦理学的合理性、社会道德规范的可行性解释、道德规范的确立和普遍化都具有不可忽视的作用。

To explain the moral issues by using the psychological mechanism ＂ sympathy＂ is a unique symbol of Hume＇s moral philosophy. In fact, ＂sympathy＂ is a principle that reproduces some emotion of others through the imagination. Hume made ＂sympathy＂ become a basis of a universal moral judgment through amending subjective ＂ sympathy＂ , and he had seen it as a tendency to all members of society rather than an explanation of individual＇s emotional exchange. People go beyond the heart of self-respect with sympathy and mutual understanding, thus the morality and virtues of ＂ mercy＂ and ＂justice＂ were able to be formed. The support of the emotional mechanism is still needed in the revival of the contemporary virtue ethics, so the principle of ＂ sympathy＂ plays an essential role in the formation of virtues and the establishment of the moral rules and generalization.