双寡头电力市场垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型

Stochastic Differential Game Models of Vertical Cooperative Mitigation in Duopoly Electricity Market

考虑单电网公司与双发电商所组成的渠道结构,构建了发电商投资减排、电网公司投资消纳的优势互补的异质型垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型,先后考察并比较了分散决策和集成决策下的反馈均衡结果。在此基础上,讨论了利润共享契约下系统增量利润的分配问题。研究表明:对于分散决策,电网公司选择性承担发电商的减排费用;两种决策下的发电商减排和电网公司购电价格以及分散决策下的减排补贴与发电商之间的减排竞争强度相关;在一定条件和范围内,合作博弈有利于提高电网公司购电电价,同时为此所带来的风险增大。

Considering the channel structure of a grid corporation and two power suppliers, stochastic dif- ferential game models of vertical cooperative mitigation are developed. The cooperation is heterogeneous and advantage--advantage, in which the power suppliers invest mitigation and the grid corporation invests utilization,and the feedback equilibria in the decentralized and integrated decision are investigated succes- sively. Based on the comparison between the Stackelberg game and cooperative game,the share of the sys- tem＇s incremental profit under a profit--sharing contract is discussed. The results indicate that the grid corporation would selectively undertake a potion of power suppliers~ mitigation expenses in decentralized decision. The equilibrium mitigation of power suppliers, purchase price and mitigation allowance of grid corporation are correlated to the mitigation competition coefficient. The cooperative game helps to raise purchase price in a certain condition and range,and brings about greater risk for the attempt.