交易信用与资金约束下两阶段零售商订货策略

Two-stage ordering strategies of the retailer under trade credit and capital constraint

在两阶段随机需求环境下,给定供应商向资金约束零售商提供的交易信用融资,分析了零售商的最优订货策略,并与无资金约束下零售商的最优订货策略进行了比较,研究了交易信用对零售商两阶段订货行为的影响.结论表明零售商的自有资金和市场前景是决定其两阶段订货策略的主要因素:当零售商自有资金很高时,交易信用能使零售商实现无资金约束下的最优订货量,否则零售商在市场状态好的第二阶段会出现超额订购现象;当零售商的自有资金很低时,零售商在市场状态不好的第二阶段会出现超额订购现象;当零售商的自有资金和市场前景都适中时,零售商在第一阶段和市场状态不好的第二阶段都会采用保守的订货策略.最后通过算例对结论进行了验证.

Under two-stage random demand, given a supplier providing trade credit financing for a capital- constrained retailer, the retailer＇s optimal ordering strategies are analyzed and compared with tile optimal ordering strategies without capital constraint. The impact of trade credit on the retailer＇s two-stage ordering action is studied. It is shown that the retailer＇s initial capital and tile market foreground are main factors that decide the ordering strategies at two stages. When the retailer has large initial capital, his optimal ordering quantity will reach to the optimal quantity without capital constraint; otherwise, the retailer will order more than the optilnal quantity without capital constraint at the high-state second stage. When the retailer＇s initial capital is very small, the retailer will order more than the optimal quantity without capital constraint at the low-state second stage. When both the retailer＇s initial capital and the market foreground are moderate, the retailer will order less than the optimal quantity without capital constraint at the first stage and the low-state second stage. Finally, the numerical study is given to demonstrate the conclusions.