利益导向、最优选择与现阶段农村养老保险的机制设计

Interest-Oriented,Rational Choice and Mechanism Design of Current Rural Endowment Insurance

基于参保人理性选择的视角,对现行新农保制度的利益导向机制进行的研究表明,现行制度下参保人的最优选择是低档次缴费、最低年限缴费(仅15年)和延期参保。尽管新农保的设计初衷是照顾缴费能力弱的低收入群体,但没有保护缴费能力较强群体的合理利益,挫伤了其选择高档次缴费的积极性,导致新农保陷入最低档次参保困境。此外,现行制度也没有鼓励参保人长期缴费的内在激励。对新农保制度的利益导向机制进行再设计的思路是:实行多缴多补的激励机制,鼓励参保人选择高档次缴费;构建长缴多得的待遇计发办法,激励参保人长期缴费;建立个人缴费、政府补贴以及基础养老金的动态调整机制,提高养老金替代率水平;针对延期参保行为建立保费补缴机制,防止不当得利。

Based on the perspective of rational choice of the insured, the study ot the interest-onentea mechanism oI the New Rural Social Endowment Insurance （NRSEI）shows that the rational choices of the insured in current system is low payment grade, minimum payment period （only 15 years） and late enrollment. Although the NRSEI is designed to take care of the low-income groups, it does not guarantee the interests of higher-income group who have payment ability, which hurts their enthusiasm seriously, and as a result the majority of the insured choose low payment grade. Meanwhile, the current system does not have intrinsic motivations which encourage the insured to pay long-term. We re-design the interest-oriented mechanism of the NRSEI. Firstly, build incentives of paying more and compensating more to encourage the insured to choose high-grade payment. Secondly, build the treatment of plan hair method of the paying longer and gaining more to encourage long-term payment. Thirdly, establish dynamic adjustment mechanism for individual contributions, government subsidies and basic pensions to improve the pension replacement rate level. Finally, establish pay-back mechanism for late enrollment to prevent unjust enrichment.