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基于区域合作博弈模型的大气污染治理费用分配方法研究 被引量:14

Air Pollution Control Cost Allocation Methods in China Based on Regional Cooperation Game
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摘要 依据当前我国雾霾污染的实际状况,分析了污染物总量控制中区域合作治理大气污染的必要性,而区域内各行政主体治理费用公平合理分摊成为区域能否合作的关键;建立了我国大气污染治理区域合作博弈模型,描述了治理费用分配方法(Shapley值法、核心法、GQP法、MCRS法);将其应用于京津冀区域实证分析中,并对四类分配方法进行了比较;最后指出基于区域合作博弈模型的大气污染治理费用分配将有助于总量控制规划的顺利实施,有效地控制污染、改善环境,使经济得以持续发展。 Based on the actual situation of the haze pollution in China, Necessity for regional cooperation to control air pollution under the total pollutant regulation was analyzed, while the fair and reasonable cost allocation become a key point for each administrative province in the region. This paper established China's air pollution control game model by regional cooperation and described four cost allocation methods (Shapley value method, the core method, GQP method, MCRS method). These four methods are used and compared in the empirical analysis of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Finally, the paper pointed out that the regional cooperation game based on air pollution control cost allocation will contribute to the smooth implementation of the plan of total control regulation, pollution control, and to improve the environment for sustained economic development.
出处 《生态经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第3期175-179,191,共6页 Ecological Economy
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJC630196 13YJC630072)资助
关键词 雾霾 区域合作博弈 治理费用分配 haze regional cooperative game control cost allocation
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参考文献16

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