融资需求、融资约束与盈余管理

Financing Needs,Financing Constraints and Earning Management

本文从企业融资视角,分为融资约束和融资需求研究了融资对于企业盈余管理的作用。通过对盈余管理行为的成本收益分析发现:虽然融资约束和融资需求在理论上都可能导致企业盈余管理行为的增加,但是由融资约束引发的盈余操控成本较大,从而在一定程度上对企业的盈余管理行为起抑制作用;而由融资需求引致的盈余管理行为同样会导致较高的操控成本,但是由于需求较大,相应的盈余管理所带来的效用水平也较高,其愿意承担更高的沉没成本,从而导致较多的盈余管理行为。这从理论上解释了融资对于盈余管理的双重作用问题。该结论在运用我国中小板企业2004-2012年的数据进行检验时成立。

Based on corporate debt financing,this paper studies the effect of the financing on enterprise earning management from the angles of both external financing constraints and internal financing needs. Through the cost-benefit analysis of enterprises' earnings management,we find:although both enterprise external financing constraints and internal financing needs could theoretically cause enterprises' earnings management to increase,yet higher surplus control cost,triggered by external financing constraints,will have an inhibitory effect on earnings management to some extent; and earnings management behavior caused by the internal financing needs will also cause higher control costs,yet more needs ask for better effects,and more sunk costs will be accepted,which leads to more earning management behavior. It theoretically explains the financing' s dual effect on earnings management. The conclusion is certified with the data of small and medium-sized boards of listed companies from 2004 to 2012.